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CASES NOTED
deciding the point, the majority of the Cousins Court seem to indicate
that congressional action might be upheld to regulate party selection
criteria. 53 Yet, Congress must also realize that its statutory enactments
cannot invade the associational rights of the party. Although congres-
sional action is not now being advocated, the Court's continuous
refusal definitively to decide whether party activities may be subjected
to judicial intervention on constitutional grounds could necessitate a
congressional prescription of flexible standards to correct abuses in
delegate selection.
Uncertainty in this area of law can only inhibit individuals from
asserting their associational rights. Therefore, in any future cases
before the Supreme Court where state law has clashed with party rules,
the Court should define the scope of Cousins and clearly establish a
proper balance between state, party, and voter interests.
BRUCE A. HARRIS
ONE-YEAR DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE IS NOT VIOLATIVE
OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Appellant Sosna's petition for dissolution of marriage was dis-
missed by a state trial court for lack of jurisdiction due to a failure to
comply with Iowa's durational residency requirement,1 which requires
that a petitioner in a dissolution of marriage action be an Iowa resident
for one year preceding the filing of the petition if the respondent is a
non-resident. 2 Subsequently, pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, appellant brought a class action against the state of
Iowa and the trial court judge seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa,
asserting that Iowa's durational residency requirement violated the
United States Constitution on equal protection and due process
grounds. After certifying that the appellant represented the class of
persons who had resided in Iowa for less than one year, and who
desired to initiate dissolution of marriage actions, 3 the three-judge
district court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.4 On appeal the
United States Supreme Court5 held, affirmed: The Iowa one-year
53. But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (where the Justices were widely split on
the issue of congressional intervention into state election qualifications).
1. IOWA CODE § 598.6 (1971).
2. Appellant-wife moved to Iowa in August 1972 and filed her petition for dissolution of
marriage in September 1972. Respondent-husband was a resident of New York at the time of
filing.
3. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
4. Id.
5. Before the Court dealt with the substantive issues of Sosna, it first addressed itself to the
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durational residency requirement for dissolution of marriage is not
violative of the equal protection clause on the alleged ground that it
establishes two classes of persons and discriminates against those who
have recently exercised their right to travel to Iowa; nor is the resi-
dency requirement repugnant to the due process clause on the asserted
grounds that it denies access to the courts for petitioning for a dissolu-
tion of marriage and denies a petitioner an opportunity to make an
individualized showing of domicile. Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553
(1975).
Domestic relations is an area of the law that has been traditionally
reserved to the states, 6 although constitutional limitations have been
found applicable in a few cases. 7 States have commonly provided for
durational residency requirements as a condition precedent to a finding
of jurisdiction in a dissolution of marriage or divorce action, 8 and the
one-year period selected by Iowa 9 is the length of time imposed by a
question of whether a "case or controversy" as contemplated by article III of the Constitution was
presented because by the time the case reached the Court, the appellant had satisfied the Iowa
durational residency requirement; the statute, therefore, no longer stood as a barrier to her
attempts to secure a dissolution of her marriage in the Iowa courts. In fact, the appellant had
already obtained a divorce in New York. 95 S. Ct. at 557 n.7. The Court held that even though
the claim of the named plaintiff (appellant) had become moot, an actual case and controversy
existed between the named defendant and the class of unnamed persons represented by the
named plaintiff because, upon certification of the class action by the district court, the class
acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by the named plaintiff. Id. at 557-59;
Mr. Justice White filed a vigorous dissent. Id. at 563-67.
6. 95 S. Ct. at 559; Ohio ex rel. Popouici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930) (divorce);
Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (divorce and alimony); In re Barrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890) (child custody); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (divorce and
alimony).
7. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (due process and equal protection clauses
require that a putative father be given notice and opportunity to be heard at his child's custody
hearing); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process clause prohibits a state from
denying, solely because of inability to pay court fees and costs, access to its courts to indigents
who, in good faith, seek judicial dissolution of their marriage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (state's statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial
classifications was violative of both due process and equal protection).
8. 95 S. Ct. at 560 & nn.15-18. Forty-eight states have durational residency requirements.
Some are applicable to all divorce actions, others only when the respondent is not domiciled in
the forum state, and still others are applicable depending on where the grounds for the divorce
have accrued. Louisiana and Washington are the exceptions. For a fifty state compilation of
residence requirements see NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, DIVORCE,
ANNULMENT AND SEPARATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1973) [hereinafter cited as DIVORCE,
ANNULMENT AND SEPARATION IN THE UNITED STATES].
9. The Supreme Court of Iowa has defined the term "resident," as used in the state's
durational residency requirement under IOWA CODE § 598.6 (1971), to be the equivalent of
domicile. 95 S. Ct. at 560; Korsund v. Korsund, 242 Iowa 178, 45 N.W.2d 848 (1951). Thus, the
effect of the one-year residency requirement is to preclude a petitioner from making a showing of
such domicile until the one-year period has passed, even though domicile has been previously
established. 95 S. Ct. at 562.
This interpretation of "residency," which requires proof of domicile, is in accord with the
overwhelming number of states. The classic test of domicile is residence plus a present intention
to make the state one's home. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 15, 16, 18
(1971).
In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1975), the Court stated that "[u]nder our
system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on
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majority of the states. 10 Nonetheless, the equal protection issue raised
in Sosna has significant constitutional implications with respect to
these residency requirements. In order to place the issue in its proper
perspective, it is necessary to review the history of equal protection-
right to travel cases that have dealt with other durational residency
requirements.
The right to travel is based upon two constitutional theories. 1
The first is that the right to travel within the United States is protected
against state action restricting the freedom of physical movement or
the right to engage in commerce. 12 The reasons articulated derive
essentially from principles of federalism: the need for a strong central
government and for commerce between the states. 13 Therefore, in
United States v. Guest, 14 although not pointing to a particular provi-
sion of the Constitution, the Court characterized the right to interstate
travel as "fundamental.' 5 The second theory recognizes the right to
travel as an element of individual freedom. The right to travel abroad,
for example, which does not involve considerations of federalism, has
been found to be an element of the "liberty" protected by the fifth
amendment's due process clause.
16
In 1969 the fundamental right to travel was entwined with equal
protection and durational residency requirements in the case of Sha-
piro v. Thompson. 17 There, a state statute denying welfare benefits to
those who had not lived in the state for one year was found to violate
equal protection. 18 The Court held that any classification which serves
domicil." However, it should be noted that the Court did not phrase this in the form of a
constitutional mandate.
10. 95 S. Ct. at 560 & nn.15-17; DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, AND SEPARATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 8. The periods vary among the states and range from six weeks to two years.
See, e.g., IDAHO-CODE § 32-701 (1963) (six weeks); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 208, §§ 4-5
(Supp. 1975) (two years); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125.020(e) (1973) (six weeks); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 15-2-2 (Supp. 1974) (two years).
11. The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 67, 72 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Supreme Court, 1972 Term].
12. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44 (1868). In Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 418 (1871), the privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the Constitution was
employed to strike down a state license tax on out-of-state "drummers." The Court found that the
privileges and immunities clause "protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other
State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade or business without
molestation." Id. at 430.
13. Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 11; Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare,
and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 989, 992-93 (1969).
14. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
15. Id. at 757. "The right of interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic
constitutional freedom." Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 & n.7 (1974).
See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 237, 285-86
(1970) (separate opinion of Brennan, White, & Marshall, JJ.) (Stewart, J., concurring and
dissenting, with whom Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., joined); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
16. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
17. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
18. The Court observed that the statute's requirements created two classes of need)' resi-
dents "indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have
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to penalize those persons who have exercised their fundamental con-
stitutional right to travel would be subject to strict scrutiny, 19 but
added the caveat that certain types of "waiting-period or residency
requirement[s] . . . may not be penalties upon the exercise of the
constitutional right of interstate travel. ' 20 This caveat and the Court's
extensive discussion of the evidence that the state had actually in-
tended to deter migration, 2' however, created confusion as to the
reach of Shapiro and as to the necessity of actual deterrence before the
strict scrutiny test would be applied.
Three years later, in Dunn v. Blumstein, 2 2 the Court implied that
all durational residency requirements constituted "penalties" and
would be subject to strict scrutiny. The majority in Dunn did not rest
on a finding that travel was actually deterred, but, rather, on the
resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the
jurisdiction." Id. at 627.
19. Id. at 634. Strict scrutiny is also referred to as the "compelling state interest" test.
Conventional equal protection analysis is comprised of a two-tier approach: (1) strict scrutiny or
the compelling state interest test, and (2) the rational basis test. Strict scrutiny means that the
ordinary presumption in favor of a statute's constitutionality is not entertained. See, e.g.,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911). Instead, the government has the burden of demonstrating that a "compelling governmen-
tal interest" makes the particular classification necessary. Even if such an interest is shown, the
classification is not deemed necessary if the same interest could have been furthered by less drastic
means. 95 S. Ct. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Due to the heavy burden which is placed on the government when strict scrutiny is invoked, the
government is rarely able to prevail. Note, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800, 810-11 & n.74 (1974). Thus,
the decision to apply strict scrutiny is very often the determinative factor whether the statute will
be found constitutional. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court has held in only two cases prior to Sosna that durational residency
requirements passed strict scrutiny. See Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (per curiam)
(50-day durational residency requirement for voting); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973)
(same).
State action is subject to strict scrutiny when it creates classes based on "suspect criteria."
See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam) (probably suspect when based on
illegitimacy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (possibly suspect
when based on sex); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (poverty when it results in an
absolute deprivation); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947) (nationality).
State action which abridges a fundamental right is also subject to strict scrutiny. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (implying that a fundamental right to privacy has been
recognized); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right to travel), Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 664 (1966) (right to vote); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
Other state action which creates classifications is subject to the "rational basis" test, under
which the action will be upheld if rationally related to a permissible state goal.
This standard puts the burden on the challenger to show that the classification has no
reasonable basis. To sustain the classification the court need merely find any reasonably conceiv-
able state of facts that support it. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961).
Under this lenient standard, legislation of even the most tenuous rationality has been upheld.
Note, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800, 813 (1974); see, e.g., Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
20. 394 U.S. at 638, n.21 (waiting-period or residency requirements for voting, tuition-free
education, practicing a profession, hunting, fishing and so forth).
21. Id. at 627-33.
22. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). The Court invalidated one-year state and three-month county
durational residency requirements for voting, in part because of their effect on interstate travel.
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principle that it was a "fundamental misunderstanding of the law" to
believe that an absence of either an intent to deter or actual deterrence
could provide a basis for not applying the strict scrutiny test.
2 3
Notwithstanding Dunn's rather broad implication that all dura-
tional residency requirements must pass strict scrutiny, the Court did
not thereafter find all such statutes to be unconstitutional penalties,
but summarily affirmed district court rulings upholding durational
residency requirements for receiving in-state tuition benefits24 and
taking bar examinations. 25 Moreover, in Vlandis v. Kline, 26 where the
plaintiffs equal protection-right to travel argument was clearly at
issue, the Court decided the case on other grounds, 27 thus further
indicating its desire to avoid the sweeping language of Dunn.
The Court's final pronouncement on the matter prior to Sosna
was Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County28 which involved a one-
year residency requirement for eligibility to receive state subsidized
non-emergency medical care. Here the Court held that strict scrutiny
would be applicable only when a durational residency requirement
resulted in both: (1) a denial of a benefit to new residents which would
"penalize" the exercise of the right to travel and settle in a new state, 29
and (2) a deprivation of a "basic necessity of life."'30 This approach had
the advantage of shifting the focus of analysis to the type of depriva-
tion actually suffered by the party, rather than utilizing the slightest
effect on the right to travel as a justification for invoking strict
scrutiny.
3 1
In Sosna, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, departed
from the two-prong Maricopa County approach. The questions of
whether Iowa's one-year residency requirement constituted a "penalty"
on the right to travel32 and whether the obtaining of a dissolution of
marriage is a "basic, necessity of life," 33 were not even considered.
23. Id. at 342.
24. Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057, aff'g mem. 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973).
25. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020, aff'g mem. Scuffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257
(D.N.M. 1972).
26. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
27. Note, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800, 803 & nn.26, 27 (1974).
28. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
29. Id. at 256-59.
30. Id. at 259-61. The Court found that the deprivation of non-emergency medical care
constituted a deprivation of a "basic necessity of life." Though the majority stated that the
welfare benefits in Shapiro and the voting rights in Dunn were "basic necessities of life," id. at
259, room was left for considerable argument as to what actually constituted a "basic necessity of
life." See id. at 285 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 41, 117 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court, 1973 Term].
31. See Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 11, at 74.
32. In light of Shapiro, Dunn and Maricopa County, which all dealt with one-year residency
requirements, Iowa's one-year residency requirement might very well constitute a "penalty" for
equal protection-right to travel purposes.
33. In his dissent in Sosna, Justice Marshall clearly agreed with the proposition that the
obtaining of a dissolution of marriage constitutes a basic necessity of life. 95 S. Ct. at 567. See
also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (divorce is an adjustment of a fundamental
human relationship); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is one of the basic
personal rights of free man).
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Rather than using the Maricopa County standards to determine
whether the strict scrutiny or rational basis test should be applied, the
majority opinion distinguished Sosna from Shapiro, Dunn, and Mar-
icopa County on three grounds and applied what would appear to be a
rational basis test. 34 The reasons for distinguishing Sosna and the
reasons for upholding the classification under the rational basis test
were essentially the same.
The first ground for distinction can be referred to as the budgetary
or record-keeping distinction.
What [Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County] had in com-
mon was that the durational residency requirements they
struck down were justified on the basis of budgetary or
record-keeping considerations which were held insufficient to
outweigh the constitutional claims of the individuals. ...
Iowa's residency requirement [however] may reasonably
be justified on grounds other than purely budgetary consider-
ations or administrative convenience.
35
Though this statement is true, it appears to be an artifical distinction
which circumvents the real focus of the equal protection-right to travel
issue, i.e., whether there has been a penalty upon the right to travel
and what the nature of the actual deprivation has been to the ag-
grieved party.
The second distinction was that the Iowa residency requirement
merely delayed the receipt of the benefit (obtaining judicial cognizance
of a petition for dissolution of marriage) as opposed to totally denying
it. This distinction has difficulty withstanding analysis, however, be-
cause there is a penalty upon the right to travel regardless of whether
the benefit is totally denied or merely delayed.
[The Court's] analysis ... ignores the severity of the depriva-
tion suffered by the divorce petitioner who is forced to wait a
year for relief. . . . The injury accompanying that delay is
34. Although the majority never labeled the test, it appears that the rational basis test was
employed. The Court delineated a number of state interests that were protected by the durational
residency requirement, which is indicative of the reasoning that the means (one-year residency
requirement) are rationally related to achieving the end (protecting the various state interests).
See 95 S. Ct. at 561. This mode of analysis is traditionally utilized in applying the rational basis
test. See note 19 supra. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Sosna opinion, appeared
to favor the rational basis standard for equal protection analysis of the right to travel in his
Maricopa County dissent. 415 U.S. at 277-88.
Justice Marshall's Sosna dissent referred to this test applied by the majority as an "ad hoc
balancing test." 95 S. Ct. at 567. However, in the majority opinion there was no comparison
made between the appellant's and the state's interests which is essential to such a test. This
approach has been utilized in evaluating state regulation of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325
U.S. 761 (1945).
35. 95 S. Ct. at 561. This seems to be a highly attenuated interpretation of Shapiro, Dunn
and Maricopa County, since such would seem to imply that an ad hoc balancing test was applied
in those three cases. However, even a cursory reading of those cases will reveal that the
compelling interest test was applied.
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not directly measurable in money terms like the loss of wel-
fare benefits, but it cannot reasonably be argued that when
the year has elapsed, the petitioner is made whole. The year's
wait prevents remarriage and locks both partners into what
may be an intolerable destructive relationship.
36
In light of these considerations, it would appear that a petitioner for
dissolution of marriage cannot "ultimately obtain the same opportunity
for adjudication" 3
7 after a one-year waiting period has elapsed.
38
In addition, this distinction is inconsistent with prior case law.
39
Mr. Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent that if such a distinction
36. 95 S. Ct. at 568-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37. 95 S. Ct. at 561.
38. The distinction between mere delay and total denial was also the majority's basis for
finding the Iowa durational residency requirement not repugnant to the due process clause. This
distinction is subject to the same criticism when applied to due process as when applied to equal
protection.
The due process argument in Sosna was made in two parts. In one part the Court held that
there was no due process denial of an opportunity to be heard because there was only a one-year
delay in obtaining cognizance of the dissolution petition as opposed to a total denial thereof. 95 S.
Ct. at 563. A contrary position has been taken, however, by certain justices. Id. at 569 & n.2; see
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383-86 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring), construed in State
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
The other part of the due process argument dealt with the constitutionality of an irrebuttable
presumption of no-domicile until the one-year residency requirement is fulfilled. Earlier, in
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Court had considered a state statute which provided
an irrebuttable presumption of non-residence during the entire tenure in the state university
system for those students who were not residents of the state at the time of application for
admission. The Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
permit a state to deny an individual the opportunity to present evidence that he is a bona fide
resident and entitled to in-state college tuition rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable
presumption of non-residence, when (1) that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in
fact, and (2) when the state has a reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determina-
tion. This two-pronged test was not applied in Sosna, however. Instead, the Sosna majority
resorted to a qualification made in Vlandis, saying "that [the Vlandis] decision should not 'be
construed to deny a State the right to impose ... , as one element in demonstrating bona fide
residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement.' " 95 S. Ct. at 562, quoting Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
Analytically, the difference between Sosna and Vlandis is that in Sosna the statute created
an irrebuttable presumption that domicile could not be established for one year, while in Vlandis
the presumption continued until the student terminated his relationship with the state university
system. Though Sosna was impliedly distinguished on the basis that the irrebuttable presumption
therein was non-permanent rather than "permanent" as in Vlandis-the Court speaking in terms
of mere delay and total denial-it would seem that this permanent-temporary distinction is
insufficient to preclude the application of the Vlandis test. Furthermore, difficulties are foresee-
able in applying this distinction since the concept of permanence is relatively esoteric; e.g., is the
Vlandis irrebuttable presumption a "permanent" one, or is it merely non-permanent to last for an
uncertain length of time, that is, until the student's relationship with the university system is
terminated? It should also be noted that the irrebuttable presumption has been subject to a good
deal of criticism. See Note, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
The majority's third justification for not finding Sosna apposite to Vlandis was that an
individualized showing of domicile would not entitle a petitioner to a dissolution because the
Iowa statute required not only domicile, but also residence in the state for one year in order to
exercise jurisdiction. 95 S. Ct. at 562. This, however, is merely stating a reason through the use
of a conclusion, since the second prong of the Vlandis test is whether the state has a reasonable
alternative means of making its determination; i.e., could the state determine domicile without
the use of the one-year durational residency requirement?
39. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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were applied to Maricopa County, the claim for non-emergency medi-
cal care should not have been granted because the patient would have
eventually qualified for the same type of service after the one-year
residency period had expired. 40
Finally, the Court distinguished Sosna from prior residency cases
on the ground that termination of marriage was an area traditionally
reserved to the states. The Court reasoned that since significant social
consequences, including marital status, property rights, alimony, sup-
port, and child custody, may be affected by a dissolution, the state
may regulate the process by which it is granted, requiring the
petitioner to have a "modicum of attachment to the State '4 1 and that,
therefore, a one-year residency requirement is proper.4 2
However, the majority did not consider that
by declining to exercise divorce jurisdiction over its new
citizens, Iowa does not avoid affecting these weighty social
concerns; instead, it freezes them in an unsatisfactory state
that it would not require its long-time residents to endure.4 3
Additionally, the majority failed to recognize that in the case of a
domiciliary, the state does have an interest in the marital relationship
regardless of whether or not the petitioner has resided within the state
for one year.
44
Though the reasoning for distinguishing Sosna from the prior
cases is subject to considerable criticism, the rationale given by the
Court for traditional state control of termination of marriage proceed-
ings appears sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the one-year
residency requirement under the rather lenient rational basis test.45
Had the Court applied the Maricopa County test, however, strict
scrutiny would have been in all probability applicable, and since strict
scrutiny requires a finding of unconstitutionality if the state interest
40. 95 S. Ct. at 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. 95 S. Ct. at 561.
42. Id. at 562. In this regard the Court further declared that a state is entitled to provide
such a residency requirement as a means of minimizing the susceptibility of its own dissolution
decrees to collateral attack for improper domicile and to discourage those seeking "quickie
divorces" from descending upon it. Id.
However, the dissent suggested that these interests would be adequately protected by a
simple showing of domicile, because (1) a good-faith determination of domicile would provide the
necessary screening process for a state to avoid becoming a haven for divorce seekers, while also
meeting the full faith and credit requirements set out by the Court in Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1957) and (2) even the residency* requirement does not provide protection against
collateral attack if the question of domicile is incorrectly determined. Id. at 570 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
It should also be noted that the finding of the. Iowa statute to be unconstitutional would
likewise affect other states with similar requirements and thus give little incentive for those
seeking a dissolution to converge upon Iowa. Moreover, Iowa has a 90-day conciliation period
which would further "serve to discourage peripatetic divorce seekers who are looking for the
quickest possible adjudication." Id. at 571 n.9.
43. Id. at 569 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
45. See note 19 supra.
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could be attained by less drastic means, 46 the availability of the "pure
domicile" test would have rendered the Iowa statute unconstitution-
al.4
7
Thus, the significance of Sosna is not in the answers it provides,
but, rather, in the questions that it raises as to the future applicabil-
ity of equal protection-right to travel challenges to durational resi-
dency requirements. 48 Because the "budgetary or record-keeping" and
"mere delay-total denial" distinctions are tenuous, it is arguable that
Sosna is an isolated decision. In addition, it is arguable that Sosna was
actually decided on the basis that termination of marriage has been
traditionally a matter of state law.
4 9
Nevertheless, Sosna suggests even further limitations upon the
Maricopa County test when considered in connection with a number of
other factors. In Vlandis v. Kline, for example, the Court completely
failed to discuss the equal protection-right to travel argument, though
it was clearly an issue, 50 perhaps indicating a desire to avoid the
rigidity of strict scrutiny without openly repudiating Shapiro and
Dunn.5 Furthermore, Maricopa County was itself a limitation on the
broad implications of Dunn,52 and Sosna, while distinguishing this
prior line of cases, clearly limits the Maricopa County test with respect
to dissolution of marriage durational residency requirements.
If Sosna is indicative of a general change in the Court's analysis of
equal protection-right to travel cases, however, it has not presented a
clear answer to the question of when the strict scrutiny rather than the
rational basis test will be applicable. Moreover, although it appears
that the majority applied a rational basis test, 53 it is possible that
Sosna is representative of a shift to a new mode of analysis, such as ad
hoc balancing.5 4 Until these questions are dealt with in future deci-
46. See note 19 supra.
47. 95 S. Ct. at 570 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. The Sosna opinion did not deal with the question of whether the Iowa durational
residency requirement was violative of the equal protection clause on the ground that it provides
for a one-year waiting period when the petitioner is a resident of the state and the respondent is
not, without imposing the same requirement when the respondent resides within the state, but
the petitioner does not. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 n.1 (1973) (McManus, C.J.,
dissenting).
49. This argument is buttressed by the Court's language in noting that
We therefore hold that the state interest in requiring that those who seek divorce trom
its courts be genuinely attached to the State, as well as a desire to insulate divorce
decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack, requires a different resolution of the
constitutional issue presented than was the case in Shapiro, supra, Dunn, supra, and
Maricopa County, supra.
95 S. Ct. at 562.
50. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
51. Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 11, at 75.
52. See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 34 supra.
54. Ad hoc balancing might provide a more flexible form of analysis than the traditional
strict scrutiny-rational basis dichotomy. While strict scrutiny provides great protection to the
right to travel, it accords little respect to state sovereignty. On the other hand, the rational basis
test defers to state sovereignty, but provides little protection to the right to travel. Supreme
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sions, the reach of Sosna upon equal protection-right to travel chal-
lenges to durational residency requirements will remain speculative.
JEFFREY M. BAIN
Court, 1973 Term, supra note 30, at 117-19. However, ad hoc balancing has the disadvantage of
lacking clear guidelines for its application and possibly allowing the outcome to be a function of
individual Justice's personal preferences.
